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EBAY RX

Tracy A. Thomas*
From a remedial perspective, the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. reopened the age-old
question of what it means to award equitable relief.1 In eBay, the Court
rejected a permanent injunction issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit to protect a business-method patent that defendant
eBay had infringed on its successful auction website.2 This essay
diagnoses the remedial problem in eBay as the improper use of
presumptions for equitable relief that effectively prioritizes selected
legal rights. It offers a prescriptive cure for the problem in the
traditional balancing of the equities standard that emphasizes the
respective equities of the private parties, including their economic
motivations and inequitable conduct. This signifies a return to the
historical notion of equity as a legal accommodation of private and
public interests in pursuit of justice.3
REMEDIAL DIAGNOSIS
The crux of the remedial problem in eBay was the lower courts’ use
of presumptions to determine injunctive remedies. As the Court
previously held, an injunction “is not a remedy which issues as of
course,” but “only where the intervention of a court of equity is essential
in order effectually to protect property rights against injuries otherwise
irremediable.”4 Rather than using this traditional, case-by-case approach
of determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief, the patent courts
had adopted categorical rules for granting injunctions. The district court
applied a categorical rule against injunctive relief, finding that damages

*

Professor of Law, Director of Faculty Research and Development, The University of Akron.
1. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006).
2. Id.
3. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944).
4. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982) (cited as authority in eBay)
(quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)).
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were generally sufficient to protect a patentee’s rights.5 The Federal
Circuit applied a contrary presumption in favor of injunctive relief,
finding it appropriate in most cases to enforce the patent holder’s right to
exclude competitors.6 Justice Thomas, writing for the eBay majority,
emphasized repeatedly that the infirmity was the judicial adoption of
“categorical” rules.7 The use of “broad classifications” and “expansive
principles” clashed with the Court’s concept of equity as a flexible, caseby case approach. Such remedial absolutes of all or nothing at the far
ends of the remedial spectrum prevented the achievement of remedial
proportionality by which remedies should be carefully tailored to the
harm.8
The danger of a presumption of injunctive relief in the patent
context is the creation of undue leverage tipping the balance of power.
As Justice Kennedy explained in his concurrence, “[a]n injunction, and
the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”9 The undue leverage
requires the defendant to pay excessive fees under threat of going out of
business. For example, in the BlackBerry case, a patentee who did not
practice the patent extorted $612.5 million from the leading firm in the
wireless e-mail industry (almost 20 times the jury award in the case).10
The company producing the popular BlackBerry phones paid the
outrageous settlement when the district court refused to stay an
injunction against it, which would have forced the company to shut
down or significantly re-engineer its e-mail service.11
For Justice Kennedy, this potential misuse of injunctive relief to
garner excessive power in economic negotiations militated against the
issuance of injunctions to future patent manipulators.12 As a subsequent
court noted, “[u]tilization of a ruling in equity as a bargaining chip
suggests both that such party never deserved a ruling in equity and that

5. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 713 (E.D. Va. 2003).
6. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
7. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1840-41.
8. See Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of
Remedies, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 88 (2007) (hereinafter Remedial Proportionality).
9. Id. at 1842.
10. Mike Hughlett & Eric Benderoff, “BlackBerry Suit Settled,” Chicago Trib., Mar. 4, 2006,
C1.
11. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Va. 2005).
12. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842. For a discussion that such undue leverage is nothing new, see
Gerard Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809 (2007), discussing the “patent sharks” of the nineteenth century.
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money is all that such party truly seeks.”13 EBay presents a prime
example of this misuse of equity. The parties were unable to reach an
agreement as to the proper payment for eBay’s use of the previously
unemployed method. As the district judge noted, he had not seen a more
hostile set of parties or failure to negotiate a resolution.14 The request
for an injunction threatened to shut down eBay’s successful Internet
auction business, thus providing leverage for MercExchange to derive
higher fees for the use of the patent. The facts did not necessarily
support such negotiating power. In 2004, MercExchange licensed its
“buy-it-now” patent at issue in the case to uBid, an online auction
competitor of eBay, for a mere $150,000 plus potential future royalties
from uBid’s profits.15 In addition, the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) reexamined MercExchange’s patents, as requested by eBay, and
issued non-final actions indicating that both patents were invalid due to
prior art.16 The automatic injunction at the appellate level skewed the
negotiating balance between the parties belying the merits or economic
efficiency of the underlying facts.
Given these potential problems with injunctions in the patent
context, the Supreme Court balked at the adoption of a special rule of
equity for patents that prioritized patent rights above other constitutional,
statutory, and common law rights. The gumption of the Federal Circuit
in unilaterally altering the longstanding common-law principles of
equity fueled the Court’s criticism. The traditional principles of equity
had been expressly incorporated into the Patent Act by Congress, and yet
the patent courts sought to alter this remedial rule of their own accord.17
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has shown a propensity for developing its
own remedial rules, adopting, for example, its own rule for declaratory
relief.18 The Supreme Court in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc.,

13. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 582 (E.D. Va. 2007) (citing
Foster v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) (recognizing that
equitable relief in the form of an injunction is “not intended as a club to be wielded by a patentee to
enhance his negotiating stance.”)).
14. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 714.
15. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 561, 570.
16. Id at 560.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2007) (providing that the “courts having jurisdiction of cases under this
title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any
right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”). Cf. CBS Broadcasting, Inc.
v. EchoStar Communications Corp., 450 F.3d 505, 523 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that Congress
intended to mandate injunctive relief in statute which said the, “court shall order a permanent
injunction barring the secondary transmission by the satellite carrier.”) (emphasis added).
18. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 964-65 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a
licensee in good standing and not in reasonable apprehension of suit cannot bring a declaratory
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unanimously struck down this attempt to carve out special remedial
exceptions for patent law, and chided the Federal Circuit for its remedial
audacity.19
There is value, however, in the Federal Circuit’s integrated
remedial approach, which recognizes the realist insight that a right is
valued only insofar as its enforcement. That is, the remedy makes the
right. This concept of a unified right in which right and remedy are
intertwined recognizes that remedies are critical to effectively convey
the full parameters of the existing right into the real experiences of the
parties.20 If a patent property right contains the right to exclude, by its
nature that right should require an injunction to effectuate that exclusion.
The Supreme Court, however, has failed to adopt this remedial insight of
the unified right, and has instead proceeded down the path of remedial
essentialism.21 Remedial essentialism holds that the remedy is separate
and apart from the right and has no impact upon the valuation of that
right.22 This essentialism is seen in eBay in the Court’s statement that “a
right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that
right.”23 In other words, equity is a freestanding legal construct that
should not be diluted by interaction with the attendant right.
Accordingly, the eBay Court emphasized that future patent cases
must separately focus on the remedy by returning to the “familiar,”
“well-established,” “traditional” balancing test of injunctions.24 Except
that the balancing test articulated by Justice Thomas is not so familiar.
Thomas states the traditional test as requiring the plaintiff to
demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
action to challenge the patent under which it is licensed); Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d
1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a patent licensee in good standing cannot establish an
Article III case or controversy with regard to validity, enforceability, or scope of the patent because
the license agreement “obliterate[s] any reasonable apprehension” that the licensee will be sued for
infringement.”).
19. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007); see also, Dickinson v. Zurko,
527 U.S. 150 (1999) (overruling the Federal Circuit’s approach that exempted it from the
Administrative Procedure Act and its rule of deference to agency fact finding).
20. Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 673 (2001).
21. Thomas, Remedial Proportionality, supra note 8, at 76-80.
22. Id.
23. eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006).
24. Id. at 1839, 1841.
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(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.25
Factors one and two of the eBay test distinguish “irreparable injury” and
inadequacy of monetary damages as two inquiries, although they are
essentially the same inquiry.26 Irreparability is established by proving
the inadequacy of damages; thus the second factor merely defines the
first. As leading remedies scholar, Professor Doug Laycock explains,
the eBay test for permanent relief borrows from the four-part test for
preliminary relief without recognizing or understanding the difference.27
As the district court stated on remand in the eBay case: “The irreparable
harm inquiry and remedy at law inquiry are essentially two sides of the
same coin; however, the court will address them separately in order to
conform with the four-factor test as outlined by the Supreme Court.”28
Despite the new arrangement provided by the eBay Court, the
general parameters of equitable relief and their component parts are
familiar to litigators. This familiar ground helps to more clearly
differentiate the first two prongs of the test. The common law requires
first, that an injunction be necessary as demonstrated by the imminent
threat of future legal harm.29 This element focuses upon the prospective
factual threat of harm to an existing legal right. A claim that a defendant
had designed around a patent, or that the patent validity had been
25. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839.
26. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 87 (2d ed. 1993) (“Many cases have listed both
inadequate remedy at law and irreparable harm as separate prerequisites to coercive relief. This
seems to be an erroneous conflation of the two different kinds of cases, remedial and substantive.”);
see also James M. Fischer, The “Right” to Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement, 24 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 10 n.38 (2007); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s
Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, at 14, ___REV. LIT. ___ (forthcoming)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1022383.
27. Doug Laycock, Remedies in the Legal System and in the Curriculum,___ REV. LIT. ___
(forthcoming). In the preliminary context, these two factors have a meaningful difference, as
plaintiffs must first show likelihood of success on the merits (establishing a threat of legal harm)
during the pendency of the litigation, and then show the inadequacy monetary remedies. At the
stage of permanent relief, the judgment on the merits in favor of plaintiff obviates the need for
demonstrating such legal harm.
28. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569 (E.D. Va. 2007) (emphasis
in original).
29. DOBBS, supra note 26, at 87, 89 (“the irreparable harm formulation is sometimes used, not
to compare the legal remedy, but for other purposes, and may be a short (and misleading) way of
saying that, if the plaintiff seeks a preventive injunction to forestall harm, the threat of harm must be
real.”).
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challenged, might defeat the existence of such an imminent threat of
legal harm.30 The second factor of adequacy would focus upon the
preference for legal remedies under traditional common law principles.
Originating from the historical division between law and equity, modern
injunctions are still disfavored in principle because they restrain
behavior, thus prohibiting efficient or utilitarian conduct, and carry
enhanced penalties from the threat of contempt.31 The rules are all there
in the history and the precedent, but the question remains as to what
motivations will guide future courts in their application of the black
letter law.
PRESCRIPTION FOR RELIEF
My prognosis is that the future cases of patent injunctions will
emphasize the balance of the equities and relative fairness as between
two private parties. Post-eBay courts have overemphasized the first
analytical factor of “irreparable injury” despite the irrelevance of that
factor to the terms of the discussion.32 Instead, courts should situate
their concerns over bad actors, good faith, and private economic
consequences within the “balance of hardships” prong. The balance of
the equities factor provides analytical room to evaluate the specifics of
each party in context. As the Supreme Court noted in Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, a case it cited in support of its holding in eBay,
“[w]here plaintiff and defendant present competing claims of injury, the
traditional function of equity has been to arrive at a nice adjustment and
reconciliation between the competing claims.”33 This inquiry has the
capacity to assess the motivations, economic impact, and good faith of
the parties in determining whether equity will respond with a remedy.
The balance of the equities factor as articulated by the eBay Court,
30. Id.
31. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 371-73 (3d
ed. 2002); but see generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABILITY INJURY
RULE (1991) (arguing that the doctrinal adherence to the irreparability injury rule is disproven by
the practical point that most plaintiffs who request injunctions are awarded such relief).
32. See, e.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp.2d 556, 569-582 (E.D. Va.
2007); see Jeremy Mulder, Note, The Aftermath of eBay: Predicting When District Courts Will
Grant Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERK. TECH. L. J. 67, 81 (2007). Approximately
thirty-three percent of the post-eBay cases have denied injunctions in patent cases. See
http://www.thefireofgenius.com/injunctions (web log of Professor Joe Miller tracking post-eBay
cases); see also, Darryl J. Adams & Victoria Wicken, Permanent Injunctions After eBay v.
MercExchange: The Year in Review, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 417, 422 (2007) (reporting that 6 of
23 post-eBay decisions denied requests for permanent injunctions).
33. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
321 US 321, 329 (1949)).

2008]

EBAY RX

193

requires: “that considering the balance of the hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted.”34 Under
traditional equitable principles, this balancing test weighs the plaintiff’s
desire and need for injunctive relief against the defendant’s burden from
the imposition of the injunction.35 Burden on the defendant from the
injunction that creates economic waste or substantially disproportionate
impact can block the issuance of an injunction.36 A party’s bad faith or
inequitable conduct enters the mix as equitable doctrines of unclean
hands and estoppel weigh in the balance.
A focus on the specifics of the private parties parallels the Court’s
analytical emphasis in other remedial contexts.
Remedial
proportionality and its requirement of measured relief have become a
mantra for the U.S. Supreme Court as it has moved towards a universal
standard of remedial precision.37 In many remedial contexts such as
injunctions, civil rights remedies, and punitive damages, the Court has
adopted flexible balancing tests of proportionality in assessing the
appropriate remedial response. Proportionality demands remedial
precision rather than broad, remedial assumptions, and factors in
considerations of multiple variables of the particular situation. While on
its face, a test of proportionality might connote mathematical notions of
objectivity, it is instead colored by significant judicial subjectivity.38
This subjectivity, as practiced by the Supreme Court, includes an
evaluation of the relative merits of the individual players. In these other
remedial contexts, it has often been the case that the Court has viewed
the story as one in which the wrongdoing defendants are the party to be
protected.39
Discussions about the relevant private equities are evident in the
dueling concurrences in eBay. The two concurrences show that seven
Justices would resolve future cases of patent injunctions based on the
depiction of the merits of the respective parties. Chief Justice Roberts,
joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, thought the balance tipped in
favor of the patent holders.40 His concurrence focuses on the typical
patent holder who has designed her patent with the intent of practicing
34. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
35. DAVID I. LEVINE, ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 96-97 (4th ed. 2006).
36. Id. at 97; see, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement. Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872-75 (N.Y. 1970).
37. Thomas, Remedial Proportionality, supra note 8, at 2.
38. Id. at 38.
39. Id. at 30.
40. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1841-42; see also John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent
Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2160 (2007) (arguing in favor of a presumption of injunctive relief
to patent holders).
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the invention. In this case, the law historically has supported the patent
holder’s right to monopoly by issuing injunctions against infringement.
In contrast, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer, thought the equitable balance tipped in favor of the company
commercializing the process.41 For example, he highlights one case of a
bad plaintiff—the so-called “patent troll.”42 The designation is a
“nefarious term for businesses that produce no products or services and
have the sole purpose of obtaining money by licensing patents they own
and winning infringement lawsuits against others.”43 Patent trolls
“obtain patents, not to make, use, or sell new products and technologies,
but solely to force third parties to purchase licenses. Instead of investing
capital to develop inventions, patent trolls wait for the industry to utilize
a patented technology and then enforce their patents.”44 In his
concurrence, Justice Kennedy recognized that “[a]n industry has
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”45 He
expressed concern about a remedial rule that created windfalls to these
plaintiffs in cases where the patent was only for a business-method
patent, and “when the patented invention is but a small component of the
product the defendant company seeks to produce.”46
Thus, much could turn on whether the plaintiff is cast as a hero or
villain, for equity will not aid a bad actor.47 When the plaintiff is
portrayed as a bad actor, like the patent troll, Kennedy suggests no
injunction should issue.48 Conversely, when the plaintiff is the typical
good economic actor, like Justice Thomas’s examples of the university
researcher or self-made inventor, an injunction is likely to issue even
41. Id. at 1842.
42. Id.
43. Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, 92 A.B.A. J. 50, 53 (Sept. 2006). The term was first
used in 2001 by in-house counsel for Intel Corp. to describe the small companies that were suing
Intel for patent infringement. Id. The Federal Trade Commission uses the term “Non-Practicing
Entity” described as “design firms that patent their inventions but do not practice them or patent
assertion firms that buy patents from other companies (particularly bankrupt ones) not to practice
but to assert against others.” FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and
Patent Law and Policy 31 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
44. See Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP.
BULL. 1, 1 (2005).
45. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
46. Id.; see Seidenberg, supra note 43, at 54.
47. See Roger Young & Stephen Spitz, SUEM—Spitz’s Ultimate Equitable Maxim: In Equity,
Good Guys Should Win and Bad Guys Should Lose, 55 S.C. L. REV. 175, 186 (2003).
48. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring); accord, Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2035-39 (2007).
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where the plaintiff does not intend to commercialize the patent.49
Similar value judgments about the relative merits of the parties are
evident in the Patent Act. For example, Congress has limited the
remedies for infringement of certain medical process patents, and made
special provisions for federally-funded patentees.50 In this statutory
calculus, the infringing defendants are not as bad, and the protected
patent not as exclusive, as the typical case.
Yet these characterizations of “good” and “bad” parties in a patent
dispute are not always self-evident. For example, Professor James
McDonough in his article, The Myth of the Patent Troll, has provided an
alternative narrative by which the patent troll is characterized as a
productive part of the economy.51 His argument is that “trolls” or patent
holding companies can serve a valuable function as intermediaries in an
economy by providing increased efficiency to technology markets.
Under another view, patent trolls are simply the David to corporate
Goliaths. The real bad actors are the “patent pirates” like Microsoft and
Intel who steal small inventors’ patents when licensing negotiations
between the parties break down.52 When negotiations fail, the large
company proceeds to use the new technology without a license, and the
small inventor is left with no intellectual property and the high-cost of
patent litigation.53 Injunctive relief can thus provide the added economic
power to even the stakes against the corporate giant.
Thus, the characterization of the defendant also becomes subject to
interpretation. The defendant might be an evil monopolist, or merely a
humble giant, productively acting in the market economy.54 For the
humble giant, the undue burden or economic waste caused by the
injunction to that defendant becomes relevant.55 An evaluation of the
49. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1840.
50. Patentability of Inventions and Grant of Patents, Patent Rights in Inventions Made with
Federal Assistance, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212, 287(c) (2008).
51. James F. McDonough, III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L. J. 189 (2007).
52. Seidenberg, supra note 43, at 51-54.
53. Id.; Grant Gross, eBay Patent Ruling Gets Mixed Reviews, InfoWorld, May 16, 2006
(quoting president of the Professional Inventors Alliance as saying the eBay ruling will “embolden
the patent pirates”).
54. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp.2d 1197,
1221-22 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (granting injunction despite defendant’s incredulous promises to stop
violation because of bad past conduct of “staggering” amounts of infringement, failure to take steps
to avoid infringement, and propensity to continue infringement in the future).
55. See, e.g., Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2006 WL 2385139 *6 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(denying injunction for patent infringement by Toyota in small component part of hybrid system
because Toyota was a company of good reputation providing a valuable public service of new
hybrid cars and technology).
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relative merits of the defendant’s conduct and intent facilitates the
efficient breach. Where the defendant’s use of the patent generates
profits in excess of the loss caused to plaintiff, the denial of injunctive
relief will allow for that profit-maximizing behavior to continue.56
A DIAGNOSTIC CASE
Decisionmaking that incorporates discussions of the motivations
and conduct of the private parties is apparent in the decision of the eBay
dispute on remand.
On remand, the district court denied
MercExchange’s renewed request for permanent relief on a number of
grounds, including the adequacy of damages for a plaintiff who was
primarily interested in extorting money for the unpracticed patent.57 The
court subsequently awarded MercExchange $25 million in damages,
which eBay has appealed.58
The court’s analysis of equitable relief on remand focuses on prong
one, the lack of irreparable harm; however, discussions of the parties’
motivations, conduct, and status dominate the court’s application of the
equitable balance. The court used a searching exploration of the private
intentions and conduct of the parties to invert the normal David and
Goliath story of the small inventor against the giant company. EBay, the
court found, could have been viewed as a bad actor due to its position as
an infringing market monopolist.59 The status of monopolist can be a
categorical type of bad actor as the monopolist’s size and economic
power can unfairly dominate the market. EBay’s additional willfulness
of the infringement also contributed to a negative characterization.60
The willfulness of eBay’s actions, as demonstrated by its continued,
post-verdict violation of the injunction, was egregious enough to subject
it to enhanced damages available to punish or deter such bad conduct.61
Yet, the court found that the nature of eBay’s market dominance

56. The unavailability of restitution for patent infringement, in which the infringer’s profits
cannot be stripped, supports the desirability of efficient breaches of the law in the patent context.
See Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 506-08 (1964); 7
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.02[4] (1998).
57. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 591 (E.D. Va. 2007).
MercExchange appealed the denial of injunctive relief. Notice of Appeal, MercExchange, L.L.C. v.
eBay Inc., No. 2:01CV00736 (Sept. 4, 2007).
58. Judgment, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., No. 2:01CV00736 (Dec. 18, 2007);
Defendant eBay’s Notice of Appeal, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., No. 2:01CV00736 (Dec.
31, 2007).
59. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d. at 570.
60. Id. at 584 n.25, 579-80.
61. Id. at 581 n.23, 583.
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was different than the usual market monopolist because it had not
flooded the market with a unique product, but rather began its successful
business prior to the infringement of the MercExchange patent utilizing
other business methods.62 “[E]Bay is a multibillion dollar corporation
whose online marketplace brings together tens of millions of buyers and
sellers around the world, and eBay unquestionably has a substantial
impact on the United States’ economy, furthermore, eBay’s success predates its infringement.”63 The burden to eBay from shutting down or
redesigning its business that had been created prior to the patent
infringement and which involved other technologies aside from the
patent appeared significant. Moreover, the court was concerned about
the additional unfairness to eBay’s successful business raised by the
questionable validity of the buy-it-now patent which was up for review
at the PTO.64
The district court on remand also characterized the plaintiff,
MercExchange, as a bad actor lacking good faith in its dealings with
eBay and the court. MercExchange, the court noted, “is a company with
two employees that work out of their homes and appear to specialize in
litigation and obtaining royalties for licenses based on the threat of
litigation.”65 The company was portrayed as lurking in the shadows,
waiting to spring on successful businesses only after they had achieved
market success.66
The court repeatedly employed estoppel-type
language to criticize MercExchange for its inconsistent behavior and
change of position with respect to the request for an injunction.67 It
noted MercExchange’s failure to request a preliminary injunction, thus
allowing eBay to continue its business, and prior actions seeking to
license its product to eBay and other companies as inconsistent with a
genuine desire to exercise the right to exclude.68 The court also framed
this argument in terms of waiver, stating that “it was MercExchange that
62. Id. at 580, 584 n.25.
63. Id. at 587.
64. It also took notice of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007), which in the court’s view, cast even further doubt upon the validity of the
patent at issue. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp.2d. at 574, 584. “Applied to the instant facts, the KSR
opinion reduces the likelihood that the `265 patent will survive reexamination as the PTO’s prior
non-final actions were issued prior to KSR, which plainly raised the bar as to what qualifies as nonobvious.” MercExchange, 500 F. Supp.2d. at 574.
65. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 587.
66. Id. at 572. “MercExchange’s modus operandi appears to be to seek out companies that
are already market participants that are infringing, or potentially infringing, on MercExchange’s
patents and negotiate to maximize the value of a license.”
67. Id. at 569-70, 573 n.14, 582, 585.
68. Id. at 582-83.
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freely chose to repeatedly indicate that it was willing to forgo its right to
exclude and license its patents to eBay and others.”69 The court also
mentioned the “suspicious” behavior of MercExchange by “placating”
the court by drumming up potential companies on remand as a litigation
tactic to try and show irreparable harm to market share.70
“MercExchange has attempted to disguise its true motivations to the
court, claiming that a desire to commercialize guided its decisions, when
in reality, litigation guided such actions.”71 These private equities
between the parties were significant to the court, especially when placed
in the context of the questionable validity of the MercExchange patents
before the PTO and eBay’s claim to have designed around the patent.
As illustrated by this case, the balancing of the hardships allows courts
to delve into the private motivations and possible inequitable conduct of
the parties with respect to the case at issue in order to resolve the
injunction dispute as between the two.72
Other remedies scholars have located the basis for future action in
patent injunction cases within the remedial adequacy prong of factor
two. For example, Professor James Fischer has argued that injunctive
relief in patent cases should ordinarily be limited to cases when the
patentee seeks lost profits.73 He believes that damages generally are
adequate to compensate for certain measures of loss in a patent case,
namely the loss of license royalties.74 Fischer’s framework for
individual determination moves beyond the categorical conclusion of the
eBay district court, which thought that damages might be adequate in all
patent cases, and tailors it to the specifics of certain kinds of case. This
remedial adequacy approach comports with classic remedies principles
in which the measurability, adequacy, and speculativeness of damages is
determinative of equity, and was appealing to the district court on
remand in eBay.75
69. Id. at 581 (emphasis in original).
70. Id. at 570, 577, 584.
71. Id. at 577 n. 18.
72. The court rejected express defenses of unclean hands hurled by both sides attacking
allegedly improper trial conduct by each party. Id. at 587-88. It found “that neither side has
particularly clean hands as both have engaged in litigation tactics that at times may have crossed the
line; however, neither side has successfully proven the other to be unworthy of a ruling in equity
due to unclean hands.” Id. at 589. The court noted a comment by MercExchange’s trial counsel
that “there is no end to hypocrisy on both sides in litigation, and that is true in every case, and it’s
certainly not untrue in this case.” Id. at 590.
73. Fischer, supra note 26, at 1; see also Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the
Problem of Uniformity Cost, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 421, 434 (2007).
74. Id.
75. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
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However, the broader remedial picture suggests that concerns over
the equitable conduct of the parties and their motivations may ultimately
be more persuasive to the Supreme Court reviewing questions of
remedial propriety in patent cases. EBay provides another piece of the
larger remedial puzzle by following the Court’s trend towards adopting
balancing tests to determine measured, proportionate remedial
responses. Using the cases of remedial proportionality as a guide, it is
possible to predict that the Court will be searching for a balanced
remedial response to patent injunctions as a cure for the disease of
categorical relief.

concurring). (“[L]egal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an
injunction may not serve the public interest.”).

